Deficiencies in BSCI certification

In addition to BSCI's over-reliance on social audits, the Clean Clothes Campaign has also found other shortcomings of BSCI:
Seeking the simplest (not the best!) approach: As far as the labor standards themselves are concerned, there is a difference between "social responsibility requirements" under the BSCI model and "best practices" (based on the social audit SA8000 standard). Although the BSCI guidelines contain all the important provisions, members can decide for themselves whether they want to implement all the standards. BSCI claims that its guidelines are the first step to SA8000 certification, but this minimum standard will probably become the mainstream standard for suppliers. However, BSCI does not state this in its promotional materials, but constantly refers to SA8000. In the eyes of the Clean Clothes Movement, it is more of a "simplified version of SA8000".

Lack of transparency: BSCI never discloses factory locations or information about social audits. Audit results are only sent to the audited suppliers and BSCI member companies, and even the Advisory Board members do not receive the final report. BSCI does not publish an annual report like other certification organizations, and does not summarize the members' reports or provide any information about the activities of member companies, such as the countries where suppliers are located, the number of suppliers, how many of them were audited, etc. Therefore, interested parties cannot compare/evaluate the performance of BSCI member companies. 61 Importantly, the results of the audits, when they were conducted, and the scope of the audits are not disclosed to workers. A representative of the Romanian GTZ/AVE program said that the BSCI model stipulates that managers have the responsibility to share audit results with workers, but in reality "it depends on the factory manager" whether this is implemented.

The case of Factory C in Pakistan best illustrates the low standards of the BSCI model. This company was audited under the GTZ/AVE program, and the factory manager said that although they had two factories in the same industrial zone in Karachi, only one was audited. When asked why, the manager replied that their buyers only needed one of the factories to be AVE-qualified (KarstadtQuelle and C&A are both BSCI members). This practice not only makes it easy for suppliers to transfer workloads from the "model" factory to the factory that was not audited, but also makes it easier for buyers to avoid risks rather than take real responsibility. The Pakistani researchers found that managers of factories that were audited under the AVE program denied having subcontractors, and there was no agenda item on this issue during the audit (for the importance of subcontractors to the Code of Conduct, see Chapter 2).

Transferring certification costs to suppliers: BSCI's provisions on sharing social audit costs are worth noting - BSCI stipulates that the costs of audits and subsequent rectification (called "qualification" in BSCI's words) are borne by BSCI members and suppliers by agreement. Due to the unequal power between buyers and suppliers, this provision actually means that suppliers have to bear most of the costs. Labor rights advocates have been fighting for this issue for a long time, believing that suppliers should be fully compensated after paying certification fees. The provisions on fees are biased towards buyers, which is why many retailers join BSCI. With BSCI, retailers have to invest less manpower and material resources in internal system implementation and compliance with codes of conduct than other similar responsibility certifications. Although the cost of helping suppliers meet sa8000cn.cn/BSCI/">BSCI standards is nominally borne by buyers and suppliers, many facts have proved that it is always the suppliers who pay the audit fees unilaterally and rectify the problems found in the audit. (Excerpt from "Haste makes waste-the dilemma and solution of social auditing")